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ABSTRACT: Although the impact of conflicting interests is of constant concern to those in 
legal education and other fields, a recent scholarly article and an extensive analysis in 
the New York Times suggest the problem is more pressing than ever. In the context of 
legal scholarship the problem arises when a professor is, in effect, employed by two 
entities. Disclosure of possible conflicts is the most commonly proposed response. The 
article argues that disclosure is merely a risk shifting devise that does not fully address 
the issue of bias. It draws on comparisons with products liability and legal ethics to 
suggest that many conflicts should simply be avoided. 
 
 


















Although the impact of conflicting interests is a constant concern for those in 
legal education and other annexed fields, a recent scholarly article1 and an 
extensive analysis in the New York Times2 suggest the problem is more 
pressing than ever. In the context of legal scholarship the problem arises when 
a professor is, in effect, employed by two entities. One of these employers, the 
academy, and the broader profession in which it is positioned, academia, have 
legitimate expectations of true scholarly work that reflects open-mindedness 
and objectivity with respect to topic selection, analysis, and positions taken, if 
any.3 In this context, the goal for the professor/scholar is to discover truths, 
inconvenient and otherwise.4 In effect, the professor is comparable to the 
employee of a think tank.  
The other employer, the retaining firm in which expertise is sold to 
those with relatively deep pockets, certainly places great importance on clear 
thinking but, ultimately and most often, has a desired end result in mind that 
may shape the efforts and expressions of the professor. The goals of the 
academy and the desires of retaining firms are in conflict at least some of the 
time. Professors facing such conflicts are advised that resolution can occur by  
                                                          
† Professors of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. 
 
1 Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & Arti K. Rai, Open Letter on Ethical Norms in 
Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339 (2016).  
2 See Eric Lipton, Nicholas Confessore & Brooke Williams, Think Tank Scholar or Corporate 
Consultant? It Depends on the Day, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/us/politics/think-tank-scholars-corporateconsultants.html. 
3 An example is found in the University of Florida regulations:(d) Statement on Professional 
Ethics. l. The professor, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement 
of knowledge, recognizes the special responsibilities devolving upon members of the profession. 
The professor's primary responsibility to his or her field is to seek and to state the truth as he or 
she sees it. To this end, the professor devotes himself or herself to developing and improving his 
or her scholarly competence. The professor accepts the obligation to exercise critical self-
discipline and judgment in using, extending and transmitting knowledge. The professor must 
never seriously hamper or compromise anyone's freedom of inquiry. 
4 This is in accord with every dictionary definition of “scholar.” 
 





being mindful of the dangers and making full disclosure to their readers.5 In 
the context of faculty scholarship, this means disclosing to readers any and all 
information that would assist a reader in assessing the reliability of the 
scholar’s work.  
This solution is inadequate for several reasons. First, the notion that 
one may be sufficiently mindful of a conflict to offset its negative effects (some 
of which may be very subtle) is flawed because it fails to account adequately for 
the impact of optimism bias. The mindfulness approach assumes that 
professors can “cure” such conflicts and prevent them from having an impact 
on their scholarship by consciously paying attention to the possibility that 
conflicts are, in fact, having an impact on their research and publication. The 
ability to perceive the danger of an impact, however, will in many cases be 
clouded by an unconscious bias that will lead the scholar to believe that such 
effects are either, not occurring or are under his/her control. Any approach to 
conflicts that relies excessively or exclusively upon self-policing will suffer 
from this problem.  
Second, reliance upon disclosure as a cure seems to excuse the scholar 
from responsibility for the effects of the conflict simply because the reader has 
been forewarned. The ethical and practical implications of an easy out for the 
scholar are troubling. The burden of conforming to the academy’s scholarly 
                                                          
5 See A.A.L.S. Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of their Ethical and 
Professional Responsibilities: “A law professor shall disclose the material facts relating to receipt 
of direct or indirect payment for, or any personal economic interest in, any covered activity that 
the professor undertakes in a professorial capacity. A professor is deemed to possess an economic 
interest if the professor or an immediate family member may receive a financial benefit from 
participation in the covered activity. Disclosure is not required for normal academic compensation, 
such as salary, internal research grants, and honoraria and compensation for travel expenses from 
academic institutions, or for book royalties. Disclosure is not required for funding or an economic 
interest that is sufficiently modest or remote in time that a reasonable person would not expect it 
to be disclosed. Disclosure of material facts should include: (1) the conditions imposed or expected 
by the funding source on views expressed in any future covered activity; and (2) the identity of 
any funding source, except where the professor has provided legal representation to a client in a 
matter external to legal scholarship under circumstances that require the identity to remain 
privileged under applicable law. If such a privilege prohibits disclosure the professor shall 
generally describe the interest represented.  A law professor shall also disclose the fact that views 
or analysis expressed in any covered activity were espoused or developed in the course of either 
paid or unpaid representation of or consultation with a client when a reasonable person would be 
likely to see that fact as having influenced the position taken by the professor. Disclosure is not 
required for representation or consultation that is sufficiently remote in time that a reasonable 
person would not expect it to be disclosed. Disclosure should include the identity of any client, 
where practicable and where not prohibited by the governing Code or Rules of Professional 
Conduct. If such Code or the Rules prohibit a professor from revealing the identity of the client, 
then the professor shall generally describe the client or interest represented or both.” 
http://washburnlaw.edu/facultystaff/otherpolicies/aalsgoodpractices.html 
 





ideal should, as a normative matter, stay with the scholar because it is an 
essential component of his/her academic job and at the heart of the scholarly 
function. The obligation to avoid conflicts and their negative effects should 
also stay with the scholar because the cumulative effect of the widespread 
abdication of responsibility for addressing conflicts through easy out 
disclosures will, as a practical matter, result in available research being less 
reliable. As serious as these problems are, however, they are not the core 
problem with the disclosure approach.6 
This essay addresses the problem which is whether shifting the risk of 
conflicted scholarship to those who pay the scholar’s salary and to the 
consumers of his or her is work is appropriate. The disclosure approach 
essentially shifts the risk of those conflicts to readers, listeners, and to 
academic employers who have reasonable expectations of objective and open-
minded scholarship. Notably, by shifting the risk in this manner, the professor 
is then able to serve two masters (and collect two paychecks).  
In the next section, we will discuss the sources of conflicts and we will 
note that many are not avoidable, but some are. These “moonlighting” 
activities can prove to be intellectually and financially rewarding for scholars. 
In section III we will examine other instances –- products liability and legal 
ethics -- in which disclosure is and is not regarded as sufficient as sufficient to 
address “conflicted” scholarship and compare those with the standards in 
academia. Next, we will search for a rationale, other than self-interest, for the 
approach taken in academia. The final section argues that the “disclosure as 
risk-shifting” approach is flawed because it does not have an apparent or 
articulated rationale, but instead seems to reason backwards from a conclusion 
that dual employment and compensation should be facilitated and justified. We 
conclude that, in general, scholars should make a choice between scholarly 




                                                          
6 A third possibility is that the availability of paid opportunities outside the academy may 
influence the fields pursued and teaching preferences inside the academy.  
 





2. SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
2.1. INHERENT 
Some biases are inherent. Some of those we try to neutralize and others we 
embrace. For example, everyone’s life experience will create in them 
preferences about the way things should be as a normative matter. Even the 
most ardent scholar cannot escape some influences that may prevent him or 
she from being what might be called the “perfect scholar.”7 In fact, if 
disclosure happens in its full-blown form, every author would reveal his or 
her, age, gender, race, socioeconomic background, education, employment 
experience, and more. All of these factors impede the scholar’s ability to 
remain objective. For example, a lower socioeconomic class person may be 
reluctant to report that terminable-at-will employment has an upside and a 
downside in terms of the welfare of those less well off.8 Although no one can 
become the perfect scholar, the concept can be an aspirational ideal that 
requires awareness of the pervasiveness of influences that may affect 
scholarship and a commitment to keeping an open mind. Absent this 
awareness, the author’s personal life experience may become a cause and 
scholarship less objective. In these circumstances, scholars, rather than being 
searchers for and reporters of the truth, may become convinced they already 
know the truth and write what may be more accurately viewed as persuasive 
briefs rather scholarship. Those known “truths” (and the scholars themselves) 
may thus become more akin to clients, rather than scholars.  
2.2. AMBITION BASED 
In the academic setting scholarship can have two purposes. One is to convey 
information. The other one is to convey information about the author. These 
two objectives may seem inseparable but for the ambitious law professor (or 
one merely seeking to qualify for tenure), there can be a difference. In 
addition, authors write for a number of audiences. These include second or 
                                                          
7  The perfect scholars would be free of biases of any kind. This is, of course, an impossible ideal 
and probably not uniformly desirable.  
8 One of the authors comes from a lower socioeconomic class and struggled for years about 
whether to write an article that assessed the impact of limiting terminable at will employment 
after realizing that some of the cost of the change would be borne by those the changes was 
generally thought to benefit. The article was writtenand was followed by letter questioning the 
author’s motives. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. 
L. J. 207 (1981). 
 





third year students on law reviews, professors to whom the work may be 
referred and, finally, the general public which includes attorneys and judges.  
An untenured scholar is in a difficult position. In some areas of legal 
scholarship, such as, for example, antitrust,9 and environmental law,10 
particular approaches and viewpoints dominate. This dominance produces a 
priori assumptions and accepted “truths.” Young scholars write with the 
awareness that their work must be reviewed by other law professors, many of 
whom will likely be adherents to the dominant approach. Thus, particularly 
early in their careers, scholars may shape their work to appease reviewing 
professors whom they fear will be too quick to examine whether the young 
scholar has adhered to known the “truths” of a prevailing approach or 
dominant viewpoint. One concern is that the works of scholars who do not 
conform to prevailing viewpoints will be subjected to greater and more 
negative scrutiny than works that, in effect, “preach to the choir.” In this way, 
the desire for tenure and a longer term career may conflict with expressions 
based on objective findings. This effect cuts both ways. The young scholar may 
choose to “preach to the choir” and overstate the support for convention or 
avoid confronting convention.  
This conflict is hardly only experienced by young scholars. Mobility in 
the profession is largely dependent on scholarship. That scholarship is first 
assessed by second and third year law students and, on occasion, by professors 
in specific areas. This creates a tension between the findings of a researcher 
and his or her beliefs about what a second or third law student or a professor 
to whom the work is referred may find appealing. For example, if influential 
people in antitrust are unreceptive to behavioral economics,11 as a matter of 
professional strategy, it may be unwise to write about how behavior economics 
might inform antitrust law. Moreover, in a context where impact is sometimes 
                                                          
9 The so called Chicago approach stressing consumer surplus and allocative efficiency as opposed 
to merely deconcentrating of economic power has been the mainstay of antitrust for nearly fifty 
years. Lately it has come under increasing scrutiny.  
10
 Scholarship in environmental law starts with the premise that nearly all environmental 
measures should lean toward protecting the environment.  
11 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral 
Economics, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (2012). 
 





equated with frequency of citation,12 the choice of topics and positions taken 
may be a function of career aspirations as much as actual long term benefits of 
the scholarship. In short, the conflict thus created is between long term 
advancement in a discipline in which there are dominant beliefs and an 
objective, open-minded presentation of ones ideas.  
2.3. AVOIDABLE 
The sources of possible conflicts that are usually the subject of concern are 
those that are avoidable, or perhaps, more accurately, invited. For law 
professors, these sources of conflict range from representing clients to serving 
as expert witnesses,13 being of-counsel to law firms, or simply consulting about 
specific legal issues.14 In all of these cases, the danger becomes more serious if 
the activity takes place at a level sufficient to affect the lifestyle of the 
professor.  
It is important to keep in mind at this point that the relevant question 
for purposes of this inquiry is whether the outside activity will come into 
conflict the professor’s work as a scholar. Another way to ask the question is to 
access whether any of the scholar’s outside activities has an impact on the 
topic selected, the methodology employed, the expression of the results, or the 
credibility of the scholar.  
In the case of the scholar/expert witness, there are numerous 
safeguards – opposing experts, cross-examination – to protect the audience of 
the actual testimony. On the other hand, positions taken as a scholar definitely 
affect the marketability of the professor as expert. Anyone who has been 
contacted to act as a potential expert knows that his or her research will be 
examined very closely to determine whether he or she has written anything 
that could be construed as inconsistent with the position taken as an expert. 
                                                          
12 See Gregory C. Sisk, Valerie Aggerbeck, Robert Nick Farris, Megan McNevin & Maria Pitner, 
Scholarly Impact Of Law School Faculties In 2015: Updating The Leiter Score Ranking For The Top Third, 12 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 100 (2015).  
13  This will, of course, vary with the jurisdiction.  
14
 See, text accompanying infra note 16. In some instances, “of counsel” law professors may 
consult only with lawyers and not have their time billed to specific clients or matters.Firms may 
retain professor-consultants for assistance of a general nature and may pay their consulting fees 
from firm funds not attributable to a particular client or matter.When a client or a case is billed for 
this time, however, it is likely that the law professor (if he/she is admitted to a bar), is, at a 
minimum for conflicts of interest purposes, a lawyer of the firm and, in many cases, in an 
attorney-client relationship with the firm’s clients for whom he/she provides legal services. 
 





For those dependent on expert witness activity, this may mean being careful 
about taking strong positions or any positions at all as a scholar.15 
Credibility as a scholar may also be affected by the outcome of 
testimony. Taking positions as an expert that could not pass muster within the 
profession may have an impact on the faith others are willing to afford the 
expert’s scholarly efforts. These credibility issues have occasioned 
commentary on the hazards faced by scholars who are expert witnesses. 
Perhaps the most well-known example of this involves Nobel Prize winning 
economist Robert Lucas. He was described as having “disdain for reality” and 
“abdicat[ing] entirely the concept of the independent expert witness.”16 Some 
may argue that cynicism about the activities of expert witnesses may have 
reached the point that the credibility of the scholarship produced by 
scholar/expert witnesses is unaffected by the scholar’s assumption of other 
potentially-conflicting roles. If this is not the case, however, then the impact 
is in one direction only which is to undermine respect for such scholarship. 
 Law professors provide services to retaining firms in a variety of ways, 
including being designated “of counsel” to firms. These positions may seem 
relatively benign. One may wonder how being an occasional advisor to a law 
firm could affect scholarship. It is important to keep in mind the person who is 
“of counsel” is selling a product and that product must be worth it to the 
retaining firm. Sellers in this market would be wise not to take positions in 
scholarship that would be at odds with positions likely to be taken by the 
firm’s clients. This, in effect, provides opposing counsel with effective 
impeachment material and lessens the value of the scholar’s services as an 
expert.  Some scholars as consultants/experts/of counsel attorneys may, 
because of their affiliation with retaining firms, author amici briefs as if they 
are disinterested scholars who just happen to advance the positions those who 
have retained them. 
 Although the “of counsel” designation is variable and encompasses 
several types of relationships, from an ethical perspective:  
                                                          
15  The authors’ perspectives are informed by their own past experiences as expert witnesses and 
consultants. One recalls an instance in which he was coauthoring an article in the field of antitrust 
and was cautioned against mentioning possible anticompetitive conduct in a particular industry 
because participants in that industry were prospective customers for expert services. 
16 BRAND NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 1999 WL 33889(N.D. Illinois, 
1999). 
 





There can be no doubt that an of counsel lawyer (or firm) is "associated in" 
and has an "association with" the firm (or firms) to which the lawyer is of 
counsel, for purposes of both the general imputation of disqualification 
pursuant to Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules ... Similarly, the of counsel lawyer 
is "affiliated" with the firm and its individual lawyers for purposes of the 
general attribution of disqualifications …17 
This means that for conflicts of interest purposes, the clients of the firm are 
the clients of lawyers affiliated as “of counsel.” Consequently, law professors 
who are “of counsel” may not view themselves as having clients, but, at least 
for some purposes, they do. Among the duties lawyers owe to their clients are 
duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and, most significantly, conflicts-avoidance. 
The affiliation with a firm may mean that scholarship that takes a 
position contrary to the retaining or “of counsel” firm’s clients may 
potentially generate conflicts (or at the very least, some concerns about 
whether the firm’s clients will be displeased). A more subtle form of damage to 
the scholarly mission occurs when the scholar unconsciously avoids taking 
positions in anticipation of potential negative impact upon lucrative retention 
arrangements.  
It is possible, at least in theory, that occasional consulting will have 
little impact on scholarship. This is especially the case if payment does not 
result in an adjustment in one’s life style. The principal problem arises if the 
professor wants to be a repeat player. Nearly always, a consultant knows what 
a client would like to hear. Perhaps the consultant cannot give the client that 
specific message but measured tones and a lack of emphasis may mean more 
repeat business than a truthful “that is a totally untenable position” especially 
if means a loss of face for one of the “customers.” This, of course, does not 
mean the professor’s scholarship is affected but the professor may increasing 
become known as the “go to” person with clever ideas about how to avoid a 
price fixing accusation or, for example, how to invoke the exclusionary rule. 
Once that is the product being sold, it is a small step to lowering the quality of 
the product by producing scholarship that would dilute this expertise. 
 
                                                          
17 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY Formal Opinion 90-357 May 10, 1990 USE OF DESIGNATION "OF COUNSEL." 
 
 





2.4. PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT 
A version of avoidable conflicts that deserves specific mention concerns the 
slippage between personal development as a scholar and remuneration. Robin 
Feldman and others in proposing ethical standards for intellectual property 
professors write:  
IP scholars have become more engaged in policy advocacy, the writing of 
amicus briefs, and the practice of law. In general, we think this is a salutary 
development. Courts regularly complain about scholarship being 
unconnected to the real world, and law students worry that they are not 
being trained to succeed in practice. Greater engagement between scholars 
and the world of practice can help solve both problems and can also bring a 
thoughtful, more unbiased perspective to legislative and judicial debates 
traditionally dominated by interested parties.18  
The authors note the importance of the participation of law professors in the 
“real world” and this seems indisputable. This does not address, however, the 
issue of whether the nature of those “real world” activities should be 
determined by the market. There is no necessary correlation between what will 
enhance the development of someone in the role of scholar and the money to 
be earned by selling expertise. This might be contrasted with a context in 
which professors are prohibited from for earning outside income other than 
expenses. Rather than expertise being allocated to those who can pay and, 
perhaps, pay the most, outside employment would be steered in the direction 
of the activities most likely to enhance scholarly development. The distortion 
introduced into the process of becoming an accomplished scholar is 
exacerbated by the possibility that research and teaching preferences will be 
influenced by the potential lucrative consulting opportunities available in some 
fields but not others.  
 
3. DISCLOSURE IN OTHER CONTEXTS  
It is instructive to compare disclosure by legal scholars with comparable 
practices in other contexts. For example, the purchase of a product that carries 
a warning label – a form of disclosure - can be viewed as form of informed 
                                                          
18 Feldman et. al., supra note 1, p. 339. 
 





(implied) consent.19 In the context of legal representation in some cases, 
informed consent may permit the formation of an attorney client relationship 
even where there are potential conflicts. Of course, in both regimes there are 
times when disclosure and consent, whether express or implied, is not enough 
to fully protect the less informed party and the transaction is not permitted. 
The question is where disclosure by scholars falls? Is it sufficient to alert 
readers to the possible biases or should those who aspire to be scholars simply 
avoid conflicts? 
3.1. PRODUCTS LIABILITY  
In the context of manufactured products, the issue is when a manufacturer can 
escape liability by noting a dangerous aspect of the product. This may not seem 
to fit the think tank context but in fact it does. In both cases the conflict is 
financial. In the case of the profit maximizing producer, the product could be 
made safe but it is not in the producer’s profit maximizing interests. In the 
think tank context, the consequences are also financial. Here too the scholarly 
output could be made safe in the sense of being unaffected but that is not in 
the self-interest of the scholars. 
 In theory, disclosure that a product may be dangerous makes the most 
sense when the cost of avoiding harm is lower for the consumer than it would 
be for the manufacturer and others who would be affected. In particular, it is 
important to weigh the impact on those negatively affected by barring the 
marketing of the product altogether.20 For example, small toys can be harmful 
to children below a certain age who like to put things in their mouths. 
Presumably a responsible parent realizing this, will not allow children below a 
certain age to have access to toys with small components. Unfortunately this is 
not always the case but the solution is to remove the warning and not to 
market toys that might be ingested. Although it is difficult to place values on 
human life, if forced to do so21 the cost of eliminating the harm completely 
likely exceeds the cost of parental attention that either keeps young children 
                                                          
19  It most, thought, it is consent to some probability of harm. Whether it is rational to consent in 
this instances can be subject to various biases. See infra notes 45-52.  
20 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 69 FR 41314. 
21 Although difficult and likely impossible, placing a value on life is implicit in a great number 
regulations and funding decisions ranging from the installation of highway guard rails and the 
setting of speed limits to funding of medical research.  
 





away from small toys or involves close supervision. Shifting the risk to some 
parents some of the time arguably makes sense.  
 This might be contrasted with automobile airbags. Automobiles could 
be marketed without airbags but include a disclosure/warning that collisions 
may result in serious bodily harm or death. Buyers could then opt to have 
airbags installed. This is likely to be at a much higher per unit cost that would 
be incurred under conditions of mass production. Or they could simple accept 
the risk of injury to themselves and others. The magnitude of this risk is 
unknown and, unlike the cautious parent, controlling one’s own actions does 
not reduce the risk since the harm can be caused at any time by a third party. 
The automobile buyer is, thus, like the reader of scholarship in that he or she is 
ill-equipped to assess risk of bias.  
3.2. LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
A similar pattern emerges in the context of the handling of conflicts of interest 
under attorneys’ rules of professional responsibility and related bodies of law. 
In the legal ethics context, “curing” a conflict of interest means that the 
measures which have been taken are sufficient under governing law to allow 
all or some part of the conflicted legal representation to go forward or, if no 
such curative measures are available, declining or terminating the conflicted 
representation. Many attorney-client conflicts of interest are curable through 
disclosure and consent, but some are not.22 The concepts of consentable and 
unconsentable conflicts of interest in legal ethics are useful in thinking about 
whether conflicts in scholarship should be deemed curable through consent as 
a form of risk-shifting. This discussion first describes how legal ethics defines 
informed consent and then turns to the ethical notion of the unconsentable 
conflict. 
When the ethics rules and the common law of conflicts do allow consent 
by potentially affected clients to cure a conflict of interest in legal 
representation, their consent must be “informed.”23 Because disclosure and 
consent play such important roles in the management of conflicts in legal 
representation, the relevant rules of professional responsibility provide 
extensive and nuanced guidance to lawyers. It is instructive for comparison 
                                                          
22  Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1983).  
23 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b)(4), R. 1.9 (a), R. 1.0 (e) (Discussion Draft 1983). 
 





with the treatment of disclosure as a cure to conflicted scholarship to examine 
some of that guidance. 
“Informed consent” is defined in the Model Rules as that which 
“denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the 
lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course 
of conduct.”24 The Comments to those rules provide that lawyers “must make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses 
information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision.”25 That same 
comment also observes that:  
[o]rdinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of 
the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation 
reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material 
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a 
discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives.26  
The rules of professional conduct also provide lawyers with explanations 
regarding the relevant factors to use in assessing the adequacy of the provided 
disclosure:  
In determining whether the information and explanation provided are 
reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other 
person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of 
the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently 
represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons 
need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client 
or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in 
giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.27  
The comment to Model Rule 1.7 explains that “[i]nformed consent requires 
that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the 
material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse 
effects on the interests of that client.”28 For purposes of our comparison, this 
                                                          
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (e) (Discussion Draft 1983). 
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (e), cmt. 6 (Discussion Draft 1983). 
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (e), cmt. 6 (Discussion Draft 1983). 
27 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (e), cmt. 6 (Discussion Draft 1983). 
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (e), cmt. 18 (Discussion Draft 1983). The information 
required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. 
 





obligation to ensure that the client is not only given information, but also 
receives a clear explanation of what that information means for the client’s 
interests, i.e. precisely how the client’s interests may be implicated, is 
important. It indicates that the focus in the legal ethics regime is always on 
ensuring that disclosure and consent are meaningful vis-à-vis the goal of 
protecting the client’s right to conflict-free and competent representation. 
Significantly, the focus is not on facilitating the attorney’s desire to represent 
as many clients as possible. 
Disclosure and consent in this context assume the role of a warning 
label in the example of products liability. In effect, the client is viewed as being 
sufficiently informed to bear any risks of associated with possible conflicts. In 
addition, there may be advantages to the client in not applying the 
unconsentable conflict rule. For example, suppose two brothers ask a lawyer to 
represent both of them in their effort to purchase a restaurant. One of them is 
a chef; the other has money for the purchase price; both will sign a guarantee 
on a required loan. With fully informed consent (which would include 
explaining how their interests might diverge and that the lawyer may not be 
able to keep information one of them tells him from the other), the lawyer may 
represent both brothers.29 Similarly, a couple may wish to obtain an amicable 
dissolution of their marriage. In many instances, a lawyer may, in some 
circumstances, represent both parties in the negotiation of the property 






                                                          
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 illus. 3 (2000). 
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 illus. 8 (2000).This illustration is 
subject to exceptions and qualifications that vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 





When disclosure and consent are not sufficient, the conflict is thus deemed 
“unconsentable”,31 and representation is not permitted. In the products 
liability context this is comparable to either removing a product from the 
market or permitting its sale only if the product is modified.32 Three types of 
unconsentable conflicts are relevant here. One is the direct adversity-positional 
variety. For example two parties vying for the same broadcast license could not 
be represented by the same lawyer.33 In another type of scenario, a relationship 
with a prior or concurrent client may make it impossible to disclose enough 
information to result “informed consent.”34 Finally, under the applicable 
standards dual representation is not permitted, even with consent if no 
objectively reasonable lawyer would conclude that he or she in this instance 
could provide competent and diligent representation to both parties.35 In these 
situations, no amount of disclosure will cure the conflict.  
3.3. COMPARING A.A.L.S. “BEST PRACTICES”  
It is illustrative to compare what it takes to cure a conflict with consent under 
products liability law and legal ethics with the treatment of consent under the 
Association of American Law Schools (hereinafter A.A.L.S.) “Best Practices.” 
The comparison is startling. In products liability law and under the legal ethics 
rules when disclosure is not sufficient to protect the purchaser or the client, 
                                                          
31 Comment to MR 1.7 Comment [28]. Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the 
circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose 
interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible 
where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest 
among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an 
amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in 
which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an 
enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in 
settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the 
parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, 
with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and 
other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them. 
32 A further analogy can be found the case of the Food and Drug Administration and finding that 
pharmaceuticals can be marketed as safe and effective but with warning labels as opposed to 
drugs that are not approved at all.  
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 illus. 1 (2000). 
34
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (e), cmt. 19 (Discussion Draft 1983).] Under some 
circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For 
example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients 
refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed 
decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to 
common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with 
the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing 
separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining 
whether common representation is in the client's interests. 
35 Model Rule 1.7 provides: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client. 
 





the outcome is that the transaction or the representation is not allowed to go 
forward. As explained below, in the case of legal scholarship, however, when 
disclosure presents a similar inconvenience, the result is to allow the dual role 
and, astonishingly, to require less disclosure.  
More specifically, conflicted scholars are told to disclose essentially two 
types of information. First, the material facts relating to receipt of direct or 
indirect payment for, or any personal economic interest in, any covered 
activity that the professor undertakes in a professorial capacity.36 Disclosure of 
material facts should include:  
(1) the conditions imposed or expected by the funding source on views 
expressed in any future covered activity; and (2) the identity of any funding 
source, except where the professor has provided legal representation to a 
client in a matter external to legal scholarship under circumstances that 
require the identity to remain privileged under applicable law.37  
Note the advice given when the exception arises: “[i]f such a privilege 
prohibits disclosure the professor shall generally describe the interest 
represented.”38 In many respects, this rule makes sense since it puts the 
interests of a client ahead of those who consume scholarship. The foregone 
possibility comparable to that found in the context of products and legal ethics 
is not to engage in outside employment that creates the conflict.  
 Law professors must also disclose:  
the fact that views or analysis expressed in any covered activity were 
espoused or developed in the course of either paid or unpaid representation 
of or consultation with a client when a reasonable person would be likely to 
see that fact as having influenced the position taken by the professor.39 
Again, notice that the treatment of the issue when fully informed “consent” 
cannot be obtained:  
Disclosure should include the identity of any client, where practicable and 
where not prohibited by the governing Code or Rules of Professional 
Conduct. If such Code or the Rules prohibit a professor from revealing the 
                                                          
36 See supra note 5. 
37 See supra note 5. 
38 See supra note 5. 
39 See supra note 5. 
 





identity of the client, then the professor shall generally describe the client or 
interest represented or both.40  
As has been  explained above, the ethics rules reach a different result: they do 
not allow the lawyer to go forward with conflicted representation, if 
obligations to others prevent the disclosures necessary for fully informed 
consent. Instead, they compel the lawyer to decline or withdraw from the 
representation. Again, the rules seem to have the priorities correct but neglect 
the possibility of simply not engaging in an activity that creates the conflict. 
Both disclosure requirements seemed more attuned with allowing scholars to 
maximize their income, rather than encouraging the best possible efforts to 
avoid conflicts in the first place.  
  
4. THE PROBLEM WITH DISCLOSURE 
4.1. RISK SHIFTING 
As noted, the issue of whether disclosure is adequate can be distilled to how 
the risk of a lack of objectivity should be allocated. “Should,” of course, carries 
a normative connotation and could be equated with notions of justice or 
fairness. There are a variety of ways to approach the issue. For example, the 
Categorical Imperative would mean asking whether shifting the risk by virtue 
of disclosure is using readers as means to ends. A quasi-Rawlsian approach 
would ask what would be chosen behind a veil that meant individuals did not 
know if they were likely to be among the conflicted or among those who are 
consumers of possibly conflicted work posing as scholarship. An economic 
approach, similar to that described above with respect to products, would be to 
ask which party could protect against the risk at the lower cost.  
The answer to the risk shifting question may vary with the approach 
taken and the projected audience41 but there are strong arguments for not 
allowing the risk to be shifted by way of disclosure. For example, from the 
economic perspective the question is whether legal scholarship is more like 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., supra note 5. 
41 Given the number of ways conflict can arise and the nature of legal scholarship, it is possible it 
is already taken with a grain of salt. Like all law professors we would like to work from the 
premise that this is not the case.  
 





toys with small parts or automobiles without airbags. The airbag analogy is 
more apt because the reader has no way to gauge the actual level of the risk.  
Almost certainly the cost of recognizing existence of the bias, 
determining its impact, and discounting the worth of the scholarship based on 
that analysis is a huge one for the reader. In fact, to be perfectly safe the reader 
would be required to discount the validity of anything carrying a disclosure.42 
Interestingly, the cost to the scholar as a scholar is also high in that 
scholarship with a warning label is likely to be less valued.43 Moreover, a 
simple rule against accepting remuneration above expenses would mean 
consulting is allocated in a manner most consistent with scholarly 
development.  
From the point of view of the Kantian Categorical Imperative the 
answer also seems fairly straight forward. Those who moonlight and disclose 
are asking readers to take on the risks of conflicts of interest that they have 
created. In return for consulting and disclosing the scholars receives 
intellectual stimulation and money. The readers become the means to 
achieving these ends. The problem is that these ends are very different. It is 
illogical to think the scholar truly interested in intellectual stimulation would 
only take advantage of those opportunities if compensated. Thus, even with no 
payment, development as a scholar would occur. The leads to the stark 
conclusion that scholar/consultants are asking their readers to bear the risk of 
avoidable bias primarily in order to allow them to earn extra income.  
The Rawlsian approach is more difficult. It requires one to envision a 
situation in which people not knowing if they are to be consumers or producers 
are asked if a disclosure rule would be accepted. On a broader perspective the 
issue is akin to whether people would prefer a society in which statements by 
others were dependable or, perhaps, one like our own in which nearly all 
statements are discounted for the possibility of exaggeration, imprecision, or 
fabrication. Two added pieces of information would also be available behind 
                                                          
42  Eliminating all disclosure requirements would exacerbate the problem in that the reader might 
well assume that all works are subject to conflicts. 
43 This economic analysis can be expanded upon by asking if those made better off by a rule 
allowing moonlighting and disclosure could compensate those who are worse off by virtue 
protecting against bias. This would be an application of the Kaldor-Hick or wealth maximizing 
standard of efficiency but the issue still comes down to which party is, at the lower cost, able to 
guard against the risk.  
 





the veil. The first this that only a small number of those with elite educations 
would become the producers. Further, this small group would be able to earn 
modest to significant sums of money by taking on the moonlighting activities 
that then, sometimes, intentionally affect their veracity. The twist here is that 
even those profiting from the ability to shift the risk of their own biases will be 
vulnerable to the same lack of dependency when it comes to the work of 
others. In short, everyone is negatively affected and very few are able to 
benefit. If one follows the Rawlsian assumption of risk aversion, adoption of a 
“disclosure is enough” rule seems unlikely.  
 Although there is room for debate, it is likely that the risk shifting 
implicit in disclosure is not justified by any number of approaches to fairness 
or efficiency. On final notion that should be dispensed with is the possible 
argument that by reading an article that includes a disclosure, the reader has 
thereby consented to whatever bias the article contains. This would be like 
saying that the parent of the child who swallows a small toy has consented to 
the harm caused because there is warning label. This notion of consent is 
similar to one advanced by Richard Posner in the 1980s and confuses risk with 
the actual harm that could result from that risk.44 If this is the proper notion of 
consent then every driver involved in a car crash could be said to have 
consented to that crash even though the fault was that of another driver. 
4.2. DISCLOSURE AS PERMISSION 
Although there appears to be little written on the topic, it makes sense to pose 
the question of whether a general disclosure requirement would increase or 
decrease the instances of bias. In effect, could disclosure have a liberating 
effect because once the risk of bias has been shifted, those who might be biased 
may be inclined to lower their efforts to remain objective? Conversely, does the 
requirement of disclosure cause think tank employees to be more careful? In 
effect, they do not want the implications of the disclosure to be proven true. 
There appears to be no answer to this question. The cynical view has an 
economic flavor to it and is understood by thinking in terms of the small toy 
example. If there is no liability for harm caused by swallowing small toys it 
lowers the manufacturing costs which generally means increase production. 
                                                          
44 See RICHARD ALLEN POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 94 (1981).  
 





Similarly, a professor may reason, perhaps subconsciously, that he or she 
cannot be embarrassed by biased work since the possibility of bias has already 
been communicated. It is far-fetched to think that scholars would consciously 
use the risk shifting character of disclosure as a justification for known bias. 
On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to think in terms of a writer lowering 
his or her guard while under the impression that disclosure fulfills any 
obligations to readers. A less cynical view is that having been required to 
disclose the writer will be inclined to prove the implications of disclosure 
wrong and be especially fastidious about keeping outside interests at bay. 
4.3. OPTIMISM AND SELF-EVALUATION BIASES 
Regardless of whether one chooses the cynical or optimistic view of the 
possibly conflicted writer, there is a significant likelihood that both authors 
and readers will be affected by the optimism bias45 or self-evaluation bias46 or 
both. The optimism bias usually comes into play when people are asked to 
estimate or consider the likelihood of being negatively affected by a bad event.  
A substantial literature illustrates that they underestimate the 
probability of the event affecting them.47 These range from the likelihood of 
illnesses48 to auto accidents.49 The optimism bias can be applied to the issue of 
conflicts of interest by viewing the professor as asking him or herself whether 
he or she is as likely as the average person to allow outside interests to 
interfere with topic selection, analysis, objectivity, or presentation. If the 
optimism bias holds, most individuals will believe their efforts to be more 
objective than average. Of course, it is not possible for everyone to be above 
average. In effect, by referring to oneself, a bias is introduced. The optimism 
bias is usually found when people are asked to consider negative events. Robert 
Cooter, however, expands to a more general description: “[T]he psychological 
                                                          
45 See generally Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future, 15 J. 
SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1996). See also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 
35 J. LEG. STUD. 199 (2006); Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 Duke. L. J. 1133 
(1998). 
46 See generally Robet H. Gramzoq, Andrew J. Elliot, Evan Asher & Holly A. McGregor, Self-
Evaluation Bias and Academic Performance: Some Ways and Some Reasons Why,37 J. Rᴇꜱ. IN PERSONALITY 
41 (2003) 
47 See generally Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1653, 1658-1663 (1998). 
48 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Assumptions about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). 
49 See David M. Dejoy, The Optimistic Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & 
PREVENTION 333 (1989). 
 





origin of the bias toward optimism is believing that one’s own actions are free 
from fault, or, in a word, self-righteousness causes optimism.”50  
Cooter’s broad description probably is more in line with what is called 
the self-evaluation bias. That bias can be negative or positive; people may over 
or underestimate their abilities. Most people, though, overestimate their 
ability51 and it is not hard to imagine that those involved in outside 
employment overestimate their ability to keep their two “masters” separate. 
The self-evaluation or self enhancement effect has been found to be correlated 
with narcissism and ego involvement but not with higher levels of 
performance.52 What these areas suggest is that even if one takes the benign 
view and believes those who are potentially subject to conflicts are mindful of 
possible effects and try hard to avoid the impact of outside interests on their 
scholarship, they are likely to over-estimate their ability to succeed. 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
The prevailing A.A.L.S. approach to conflicts in scholarship seems to be a 
solution arrived at by reasoning backwards from a conviction that scholars 
should be allowed to assume these dual roles. This is in stark contrast with 
other more consumer oriented, client protective approaches. It may be 
premised in part on an a priori on the assumption that disclosure produces 
greater objectivity in scholarship. Not only is this assumption open to question, 
but the availability of the disclosure option may, in fact, be producing less 
objective scholarship because it gives scholars license not to worry about the 
potential impact of conflicts. The perverse effect of the disclosure requirement 
would thus be to produce less objective scholarship.  
Some may argue in favor of the A.A.L.S. disclosure approach because 
without the incentive of outside income, scholars would be less engaged in real 
life legal processes and that such engagement is particularly valuable for legal 
scholars. This assumption also seems open to question. Many legal scholars 
                                                          
50 See Robert D. Cooter, The Objective of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUBLIC CHOICE 107 (1983).  
51 See Mark D. Alicke, Global Self Evaluation as Determined by Desirability and Controllability of Trait 
Adjectives, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1621 (1985). Constantine Sedikides & Aiden P. Gregg, 
Self-Enhancement: Food for Thought, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 102 (2008).  
52 See Richard W. Robins & Jennifer S. Beer, Positive Illusions About the Self: Short-Term Benefits and 
Long-Term Costs, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 340 (2001).  
 





would, as long as their expenses were paid, engage in outside activities for 
educational purposes, to enrich their research, for a change of pace, and to 
fulfill the service components of their jobs. Moreover, the choice of where to 
lend expertise would likely be more in line with actual scholarly development 
because financial incentives would be muted. In fact, the outcome may very 
well be an allocation of expertise that benefits the have-nots as well has the 
haves. This is not, however, to say all bias would be removed but at least 
avoidable bias would be limited. 
 The principal drawback with the disclosure solution is that it simply is 
not designed to address the core issue: treating less than fully informative 
disclosure as an accepted and sufficient cure to conflicted scholarship blurs the 
lines between academies and firms, between scholars and consultants, and 
between scholarship and advocacy. This outcome is undesirable for a number 
of reasons. Society depends upon its universities and its scholars to provide 
non-partisan, objective, expertise-driven knowledge, which is difficult to 
obtain elsewhere. The knowledge shaped by special interest or position-based 
advocacy is unlikely to be politically, socially, or theoretically neutral in its 
cumulative effects, nor is such knowledge equitably accessible to all of those 
wishing to advance a partisan view or position. Finally, if scholars are not 
careful to avoid the impact of the conflicts this article identifies and the lines 
are further blurred, consumers may either mistake advocacy for scholarship or 
significantly discount all scholarship because they assume it is advocacy.  
 
 
